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THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA HOLDS THAT CYBER
CHARTER SCHOOLS ARE LEGAL
ACCORDING TO THE EXISTING CHARTER
SCHOOL LAw-PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL
BOARDS Ass'N, INC. V. ZOGBY
Kathryn M. Kraft*
ONCERNED about the state of public schools, Americans
pushed for education reform in the early 1990s. 1 This reform
movement spawned several innovative attempts to improve public
schools with charter schools emerging as the reform attempt most ac-
cepted by state legislatures.2 Thirty-eight states and the District of Co-
lumbia now authorize charter schools with express charter school laws. 3
In a few states, the charter school movement has led to the creation of
cyber charter schools. 4 A cyber charter school operates over the Internet
to provide instruction to students who log on from their homes using
computers purchased with public funds.5 These schools faced immediate
criticism. Opponents questioned the ability of these schools to provide
quality instruction, the schools' reliance on parents to verify attendance
and provide assistance, the amount of money these schools receive rela-
tive to the amount of money they expend, and the state's ability to moni-
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1. Karla A. Turekian, Traversing the Minefields of Education Reform: The Legality of
Charter Schools, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1365, 1372 (1997).
2. Molly O'Brian, Symposium: Education and the Constitution: Shaping Each Other
and the Next Century: Free at Last? Charter Schools and the "Deregulated" Curriculum, 34
AKRON L. REV. 137, 139 (2000). A charter school is a legislatively authorized, publicly-
funded school created by a contract between an individual or group and a state or local
school board. A charter school operates independent of many state and local regulations,
and can offer students a diverse and innovative education without the hindrance of regula-
tion. Turekian, supra note 1, at 1374-76.
3. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Paige Announces $198 Million in Support for
Charter Schools (Oct. 7, 2002), available at http://www.ed.gov/PressReleases/10-2002/1007
2002.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
4. Currently, thirty cyber charter schools operate in twelve states-Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas,
and Wisconsin. Neal McCluskey, Beyond Brick and Mortar: Cyber Charters Revolution-
izing Education, at http://edreform.com/pubs/cyber.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
5. AM. FED'N OF TEACHERS, Do CHARTER SCHOOLS MEASURE Up? THE CHARTER
SCHOOL EXPERIMENT AFTER 10 YEARS 98 (2002).
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tor these schools and their students. 6 The first judicial challenge to the
legality of these schools arose in Pennsylvania School Boards Ass'n, Inc.
v. Zogby.7 In this case of first impression, the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania held that the school districts required by statute to provide
funding to cyber charter schools had no standing to challenge the legality
of these schools." The court continued, in dicta, to find cyber charter
schools legal under the state's charter school law. 9 With this decision, the
court blocked any chance for the school districts to challenge the legality
of cyber charter schools in another forum and failed to acknowledge the
legislative intent of the charter school law or to give meaning to its
provisions.
Pennsylvania enacted its Charter School Law' 0 in 1997 in an attempt to
improve the state's education system.II Under this law, a charter school
receives funds for each of its students from the district of the student's
residence, payable in monthly installments. 12 If a school district fails to
make a payment to a charter school, the charter school submits documen-
tation to the Department of Education through the Secretary of Educa-
tion; the Secretary then deducts the debt from state payments to the
delinquent school district and directs this money to the charter school.' 3
When the Department, through its Secretary, withheld subsidies from
school districts that refused to pay invoices submitted by cyber charter
schools, the school districts, through the Pennsylvania School Boards As-
sociation, Inc., 14 sued the Secretary, Charles Zogby.'5 The school dis-
tricts proceeded on four counts, including a petition for the court to
review, in its appellate jurisdiction, the Department's decision to with-
hold the subsidies.' 6 The school districts asked the court to vacate that
decision, compel the Department to pay the withheld money, and pro-
hibit the Department from withholding subsidies for cyber charter
schools. 17 Alternatively, the school districts asked the court to prohibit
the Department from withholding subsidies until a complete hearing
6. See Penn. Dep't of Educ., KPMG Consulting: Executive Summary (Oct. 30, 2001),
at http://www.pde.state.pa.us/charter-schools/lib/charter schools/execsummprojappr. pdf
(last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
7. Penn. Sch. Bds. Ass'n., Inc. (PSBA) v. Zogby, 802 A.2d 6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
8. Id. at 10.
9. Id. at II.
10. PA. STA'r. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 17-1701 to 17-1732 (West 2002).
II. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. Collegium Charter Sch., 760 A.2d 452, 454 n.2 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2000).
12. PA. SIA'r. ANN. tit. 24, § 17-1725(A)(2)-(3) (West 2002).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 17-1725(A)(5) (West 2002).
14. The Pennsylvania School Boards Association, Inc. (PSBA) is a nonprofit associa-
tion of public school boards in Pennsylvania dedicated to promoting local leadership for
public schools. Penn. Sch. Bds. Ass'n, About PSBA, at http://www.prideandpromise.org/
aboutpsba.php (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
15. PSBA, 802 A.2d at 7.
16. The school districts also sought relief in the court's original jurisdiction. The court
determined the school districts could not proceed on claims made in both original jurisdic-
tion and appellate jurisdiction, and thus dismissed their first three claims for lack of juris-
diction. Id. at 8.
17. Id.
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could be held.' 8
The court remanded the case to the Department with instructions for
the Department to provide an opportunity for the school districts to chal-
lenge the subsidy deductions.' 9 However, the court held that, on remand
to the Department, the school districts could not challenge the legality of
cyber charter schools because the school districts lacked standing to do so
and the Department similarly lacked authority to rule on the matter.20
The court concluded the school districts lacked standing to challenge
the legality of cyber charter schools because the Charter School Law only
allows the chartering school district 2 and the State Charter School Ap-
peal Board to participate in the decision to grant or deny a charter school
application.2 2 The court found that non-chartering school districts have
an obligation to pay for their students who attend charter schools but
have no right to participate in the charter-granting process. 23 Similarly,
the court found that, should a school district refuse to pay a charter
school's invoice, the Department has no discretion to consider the legality
of the school and must instead automatically direct the subsidy money to
the charter school if the Department finds that each claimed student is
actually in attendance. 24
After acknowledging that it had addressed all the issues, the court con-
tinued its analysis of the Charter School Law, finding cyber charter
schools legal under the Charter School Law.25
Judge Pelligrini wrote a one-sentence concurring opinion, joining the
majority in the resolution of jurisdiction and standing.26
Judge Smith-Ribner wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion, joined
by Judges McGinley and Cohn. 27 Judge Smith-Ribner disagreed with the
way the court framed the issue of standing.28 While the majority ad-
dressed whether a school district has standing to appeal another school
district's decision to grant a charter, she would have answered whether an
adversely affected school district has standing to seek a declaration of law
regarding cyber charter schools. 29 She argued the school districts did
have standing to seek a declaration because the withholding of money
impacted them in a substantial, immediate, and direct way. 30 Judge
Smith-Ribner also argued that the court applied the wrong standard for a
18. Id.
19. Id. at 9.
20. Id.
21. The chartering school district is the school district that granted a charter to the
charter school. Id. at 9-10.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 10.
24. Id. at 9.
25. Id. at 11.
26. Id. at 13.
27. Id. at 13-18.
28. Id. at 13.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 15.
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ruling upon a demurrer. 3' She argued that, had the court followed the
correct standard and accepted the school districts' well-pleaded facts as
true, it could not have concluded with certainty that they were not enti-
tled to proceed on their claim. 32
The court's holding negatively impacted school districts, their students,
and taxpayers and failed in several respects. First, the court failed to
properly consider the school districts' standing and failed to grant them
an opportunity to challenge the legality of cyber charter schools, either
judicially or in a hearing before the Department. The court also failed in
its analysis of the legality of cyber charter schools because it ignored leg-
islative intent and liberally construed specific provisions of the Charter
School Law.
When the court determined the school districts lacked standing to judi-
cially challenge the legality of cyber charter schools, it misconstrued their
claim as an appeal from the grant of a charter when the school districts
were actually seeking a declaration of law.33 For such a declaration, the
school districts could establish standing by showing they had a substan-
tial, direct, and immediate interest in the subject matter.34 Though the
school districts attempted to establish a substantial and direct interest in
the subject matter by demonstrating a loss of over $800,000 in subsidies,3 5
the court determined they lacked standing by relying on a Common-
wealth Court decision that held tax payers lacked standing to challenge
the grant of a charter school.36 However, the court's reliance on this case
is misplaced for two reasons. First, the taxpayers in West Chester chal-
lenged the grant of a charter, whereas the school districts in PSBA sought
a declaration of the law. Second, the West Chester court specifically noted
the taxpayers lacked standing because their perceived harm was based on
speculation and their interests were remote and far-removed. 37 However,
in PSBA, the loss of the subsidies directly and immediately impacted the
school districts. Because of this direct harm, the court should have found
the school districts had standing to receive a declaration of the legality of
cyber charter schools.
After denying the school districts a judicial remedy, the court effec-
tively blocked any chance for them to challenge the legality of cyber char-
ter schools in another forum by finding they also lacked standing to make
this challenge in a hearing before the Department. In reaching this hold-
ing, the court relied on Boyertown, again misconstruing a Commonwealth
Court holding. Boyertown held that, before withholding subsidies from a
school district, the Secretary must give the school district both notice and
31. Id. at 17.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 14, 16.
34. Ken R. v. Arthur Z., 682 A.2d 1267, 1270 (Pa. 1996).
35. PSBA, 802 A.2d at 7.
36. Id. at 10 (citing W. Chester, 760 A.2d at 452).
37. W. Chester, 760 A.2d at 465-66.
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a chance to challenge the factual and legal grounds for the withholding.38
The court interpreted this to mean that school districts could only chal-
lenge the charter school's attendance records and the Secretary could
only determine if each claimed student actually attended the charter
school. 39 However, Boyertown specifically stated that, before the Secre-
tary could withhold money, he must determine the answers to several
questions: "is the charter school operating in compliance with the Charter
School Law, is each claimed student actually attending the charter school
and for what period has the student attended. '40 By framing the Secre-
tary's duty as a duty to answer these three questions, the Boyertown court
clearly found the Secretary has discretion to determine both if claimed
students are in attendance and if the charter school is in compliance with
the Charter School Law.
Therefore, Boyertown would support a finding that the Department
could determine if cyber charter schools are in compliance with the Char-
ter School Law before withholding subsidies. The Boyertown concurring
opinion gives credence to this argument. In that opinion, Judge Pellegrini
argued the Department and its Secretary should be limited to determin-
ing if the charter school sufficiently documented its enrollment and
should not be able to determine the propriety of a charter.41 Obviously if
Boyertown held that the Department could only determine if the students
were in attendance, Judge Pellegrini would have no reason to write sepa-
rately to convey those exact thoughts. Therefore, case law supports the
proposition that the Department and its Secretary have the discretion to
determine the legality of a cyber charter school in a subsidy withholding
hearing.
In determining that cyber charter schools were legal under the Charter
School Law, the court both failed to acknowledge legislative intent and to
correctly construe the specific provisions of this law. First, it is clear the
legislature did not contemplate the existence of cyber charter schools
when it drafted the Charter School Law in 1997, a time when the concept
of schools operating exclusively over the Internet was simply not foresee-
able. The court even acknowledges that it "cannot say that the General
Assembly actually contemplated the creation of cyber schools when it en-
acted the Charter School Law."'42 Previous litigation in Pennsylvania
supports this argument. Although no other court has ruled on the legality
of cyber charter schools, three courts faced with this issue have expressed
serious doubts about whether these schools were legal under the Charter
School Law. One Court of Common Pleas noted that the Charter School
Law was enacted before Internet technology came into widespread use
and doubted the framers considered cyber schools within the scope of the
38. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 797 A.2d 421, 426 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2002).
39. PSBA, 802 A.2d at 9.
40. Boyertown, 797 A.2d at 426.
41. Id. at 428.
42. PSBA, 802 A.2d at 11.
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Charter School Law.43 Similarly, another Court of Common Pleas stated
it believed the Charter School Law only applied to bricks and mortar
institutions.44 Finally, a federal district court noted it was unclear if cyber
schools could lawfully be considered charter schools within the meaning
of that term as used in the Charter School Law.45 By examining the cir-
cumstances at the time of the Charter School Law's enactment and by
reading previous case law, it seems unlikely the legislature contemplated
the creation of cyber charter schools when it enacted the Charter School
Law.
Not only is it unlikely the legislature contemplated these schools when
it passed the Charter School Law, but specific provisions of the Charter
School Law could only apply to a bricks and mortar school. For example,
charter schools are required to comply with the compulsory attendance
law which requires every child to attend a "day school."'46 Cyber charter
schools are not day schools and have no way of monitoring daily attend-
ance. The Charter School Law also prohibits charter schools from dis-
playing religious objects "on the premises. ' 47 Obviously, cyber charter
schools have no premises. Finally, the application for a charter school
must contain a description and address of the physical facility where the
charter school will be located. 48 However, cyber charter schools lack
physical facilities. These specific provisions only make sense if applied to
bricks-and-mortar charter schools. To stretch these provisions to include
cyber charter schools ignores the clear meaning of the statute.
In Pennsylvania, parties litigated the legality of cyber charter schools
before the legislature could address the issue. The legislature responded
to the litigation with the passage of Act 88. 4 9 This new law creates a
framework that enables cyber charter schools to continue operation, but
under stricter accountability standards. 50 However, the majority of states
maintain charter school laws with no express provisions for cyber charter
schools. In these states, as the cyber charter school movement grows
without a response from state legislatures, state courts will be left to re-
solve the difficult issue of whether their state's charter school law legal-
izes cyber charter schools. Hopefully, when confronted with this
challenge, state courts will carefully frame the issues and strictly interpret
the applicable charter school law.
43. Butler Area Sch. Dist. v. Einstein Acad., No. 2001-50031 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Sept.
10, 2001).
44. Fairfield Area Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l Org. for Children, Inc., No. 01-5-1008, slip op. at
14 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 11, 2001).
45. Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch. Dist., 182 F. Supp. 2d 435 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
46. PA. SIA'. ANN. tit. 24, § 17-1732-A(a) (West 2002) (requiring charter schools to
comply with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327 (West 2002)).
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 17-1715-A(5) (West 2002).
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 17-1719-A(1l) (West 2002).
49. 2002 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2002-88 (West).
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 1741-50 (West 2002).
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